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Harry D. Krause* & Paul Marcus** 
The protection of privacy in the United States takes many forms and 
manifests itself in tort law, criminal law, family law and a host of other 
substantive areas. Depending on the subject matter, protection may be avail-
able on the State or Federal levels or on both levels. Beyond tangible protec-
tions, the American "political psychology" of privacy has expressed itself, to 
provide but one striking example, in Congressional failure, after careful 
consideration in Committee, to enact or even seriously propose legislation 
involving an identification system of U.S. citizens or legal residents-and 
that in the face of the substantial economic and social problems caused by 
the presence in the United States of an estimated 8 million illegal immi-
grants {probably more than the total current number of unemployed). 
The right to privacy in its various forms protects against actions of 
private citizens as well as actions by local, state and Federal governmental 
agencies. In the limited space available for this report we propose to discuss 
only a few major, and quite varied, aspects of the multi-faceted American 
right of privacy. Our analysis will focus attention ultimately on what is, in 
the General Reporter's1 words, the "irreducible zone of privacy." 
We shall deal with, in order, the right of privacy {I) in the law of torts, {II) 
in the law governing criminal procedure, {III) as expressed in various Federal 
and State statutes seeking to protect the citizen against incursions into his 
private sphere by an ever-growing government and {IV) as it is newly devel-
oping in the context of sexual expression and in relation to the family. 
I. DEVELOPMENT OF THE RIGHT OF "PRIVACY" IN THE LAW OF TORTS 
If privacy as a concept of law in the United States could be given a 
concrete time of birth, it would be 1890. That was the year attorneys Samuel 
Warren and Louis Brandeis2 wrote their highly influential article, "The 
Right to Privacy."3 Although the authors focused primarily on what they 
viewed as the shocking behavior of the press,4 they called for a "principle of 
'" Professor of Law, University of Illinois College of Law. 
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1. Professor Pierre Patenaude, Faculte de droit, Universite de Sherbrooke Quebec. 
2. Later, of course, Brandeis served with great distinction on the United States 
Supreme Court, 1916-1939. 
3. Warren and Brandeis, "The'Right to Privacy," 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193 (1890). 
4. "The press is overstepping in every direction the obvious bounds of propriety and 
of decency." Id. at 196. 
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... an inviolate personality,'' 5 and a general "right 'to be let alone"'. 6 
In 1909, New York set an example by adopting§ 50 of its Civil Rights 
Law.7 It provides: 
Right of privacy-A person, firm or corporation that uses for adver-
tising purposes, or for the purposes of trade, the name, portrait or 
picture of any living person without having first obtained the writ-
ten consent of such person, or if a minor of his or her parent or 
guardian, is guilty of a misdemeanor. 
Section 51 of the Civil Rights Law provides for injunctions to prevent 
such use oi: for recovery of damages (actual and punitive) if the unauthorized 
use occurs. Most states did not enact such statues, but developed a right to 
sue in tort for various violations of privacy through case law.8 Dean Prosser9 
divided these cases on privacy into four separate actions, a division which 
has been generally adopted10 and will be utilized below. The first is appro-
priation, for defendant's benefit, of the plaintiff's name or likeness. 11 The 
second is publicity which places the plaintiff in a false light in the public 
eye.12 Third is publicity of private information about the plaintiff.13 Finally, 
there is intrusion upon the plaintiff's solitude or seclusion.14 
The general outlines of this aspect of the right to privacy resemble but 
are not identical with the concept of the "right to personality" defended in 
some civil law systems such as West Germany. 15 
A. Appropriation 
Any advertising agency in the United States would probably agree that 
products about, or endorsed by celebrities (movie stars, performers, athletes) 
are very popular .with the public. Appropriation occurs when the person's 
name, picture, or endorsement, is used without consent. The defendant in 
Palmer v. Schonhorn Enterprises, Inc. , 16 manufactured and sold the "Pro- . 
AM Golf Game," which contained a "Profile and Playing Chart" on twenty-
three famous golfers. The plaintiffs, Arnold Palmer, Gary Player, Jack Nick-
laus and Doug Sanders, all well known professional golfers, sued to enjoin 
the use of their names in connection with the game, even though the charts 
listed accurate information about their professional careers.17 
5. Id. at 205 
6. Id. at 195 quoting from Cooley on Torts, 2d ed. 1888, at 29. 
7. This was in response to the Court of Appeals decision in Roberson v. Rochester 
Folding Box Company, 171 N.Y. 538, 64 N.E. 442 (1902) denying recovery for the uncon-
sented use of plaintiff's picture for advertisement of a product. See Prosser, Torts, 
Fourth Edition 1971 at 803. 
8. The leading early case was Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190, 50 
S.E. 68 (1905). 
9. Prosser, supra. 
10. See, Restatement Second of the Law of Torts. 
11. See, Part IA, infra. 
12. See, Part IB, infra. 
13. See, Part IC, infra. 
14: This includes non-physicial intrusion, such as wire tapping. Part ID, infra. 
15. See, Krause, "The Right to Privacy in Germany-Pointers for American Legisla-
tion," 1965 Duke L.J. 481 (1965). 
16. 96 N.J. Super. 72, 232 A.2d 458 (1967). 
17. 232 A.2d at 459. 
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The defendant claimed that the use of the names and information did not 
infringe on the plaintiffs' right of privacy, since they had waived any such 
right by being well-known and, as such, had invited publicity into their lives 
to further their careers.18 The court, however, rejected that argument and 
held for the plaintiffs on the ground that a person has the right to capitalize 
on his own identity without unjustified interference. The fact that the plain-
tiffs' accomplishment had been highly publicized did not convey a general 
right to such exploitation.19 
Difficulties for the courts in this area are heightened when the celeb-
rities are deceased and their photos or names are used in connection with 
games, clothing or toys. This issue was faced squarely in Price v. Hal Roach 
Studios, Inc. ,20 which involved the rights to the names and likenesses of 
Stanley Laurel and Oliver Hardy ("Laurel and Hardy"), the famous come-
dians. The plaintiffs, widows of Laurel and Hardy, and sole beneficiaries 
under their wills, claimed to have exclusive rights to their names and 
likenesses.21 The defendant asserted that because the comedians were now 
dead, their names and likenesses were part of the public domain. 22 The rights 
involved in the instant case, however, were more than mere rights of privacy, 
according to the court, which would terminate at death; these were property 
rights which were assignable, and lived on.23 The court then decided that it 
might have been possible for the performers to have waived some of their 
rights to privacy when alive, by being so well known, but property rights in 
one's own name are not waivable.24 The court ultimately concluded that 
these rights passed as property to the plaintiffs by action of their husband's 
wills. 25 
18. Id. at 460. 
19. . .. although the publication of biographical data of a well-known figure does 
not per se constitute an invasion of privacy, the use of that sama data for the 
purpose of capitalizing upon the name by using it in connection with a commer-
cial project other than the dissemination of news . . . does. 
Id. at 462. 
20. 400 F. Supp. 836 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). 
21. The facual situation was more complex than herein described because both the 
plaintiffs and the studio executives had assigned their respective "exclusive" rights to 
other parties. Moreover, the defendant claimed that Laurel and Hardy had assigned 
these rights to the studio, as employer, in certain movie contracts. The court first de-
clared that the defendant only had the right to specific photographic reproductions made 
from the movies to which the contractual agreement applied. Although the defendant 
was given exclusive rights to those movies, there was not conferred a general right to use 
the names and likenessess of Laurel and Hardy in every context. Id. at 840-41. 
22. Id. at 843. 
23. I d. at 843-44. "The protection from intrusion upon an individual's privacy, on the 
one hand, and protection from appropriation of some element of an individual's person-
ality for commercial exploitation, on the other hand, are different in theory and in 
scope." 
24. Id. at 846, 847. 
25. In Lugosi v. Universal Pictures Co., Inc. 172 U.S.P.Q. 541 (Cal. Superior Ct. 1972) 
the court made a similar decision about the character of Dracula as portrayed by Bela 
Lugosi. Because the deceased actor had given the role his own individual interpretation, 
it became ". . . a property right of such character and substance that it did not terminate 
with his death but descended to his heirs." 172 U.S.P.Q. at 551. This case is not without 
criticism, however, see Price, 400 F. Supp. at 845. 
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B. False Light 
"Instantaneous photographs and newspaper enterprise have invaded the 
sacred precincts of private and domestic life ... "26 This brief quote may 
generally sum up the crux of the problem so often faced today. It does not, 
however, explain the interplay between two very different concepts, false 
light privacy and defamation. False light privacy consists of "publicity 
which places the plaintiff in a false light in the public eye."27 Because such 
false information need not necessarily be reputation injuring, it is not always 
overlapping with the concept of defamation .. Still, because both actions are 
based on false information, publicized, the courts have tended to consider 
them together and we shall do so here. 
The area of defamation, as illustrated by recent United States Supreme 
Court cases, involves a battle between two protected values: freedom of the 
press and certain individual rights. The media won a clear victory in New 
York Times Co. v. Sullivan,28 where the issue was the newspaper's liability 
for printing criticism of a government official. 29 
Under then Alabama law, if words were published "of and concerning" 
someone that would "tend to injure . . . his reputation . . . ", it was libel per 
se, general damages were presumed, and the only defense was absolute 
truth.30 The issue, according to Justice Brennan, speaking for the Court, was 
" ... whether this rule of liability, as applied to an action brought by a 
public offici~l against critics of his official conduct, abridges the freedom of 
speech and of the press that is guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments."31 Abridgement was found because the defense of truth was 
not enough to protect the press when erroneous statements were honestly 
made, and fear of such libel judgments would thus lead to self-censorship. 32 
The Court fashioned a test for determining liability when a public official 
seeks to recover damages for defamatory falsehoods made concerning his 
official conduct: it must be shown that the statements were made with 
"actual malice," i.e., either knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for 
whether false or not.33 The decision below, therefore, was reversed.34 
26. Warren and Brandeis, supra, at 195. 
27. Proser, supra, at 812. 
28. 376 u.s. 254 (1964). 
29. On March 29, 1960, there was published a full-page ad in the Times entitled "Heed 
Their Rising Voices," which asked for monetary support to aid the civil rights movement 
in the Southern United States. It alleged a "wave of terror" against student demon-
strators at Alabama State College by the police, and persecution of Dr. Martin Luther 
King, Jr. L.B. Sullivan was an elected Commissioner in Montgomery, Alabama, and 
supervisor of the police department. He claimed that although never actually mentioned 
by name, the word "police" could be interpreted as referring to him. Therefore, due to 
admittedly incorrect statements of fact contained in the ad, he sued the newspaper's 
publishers for libel, and was awarded $500,000 in the Alabama court system. I d. at 256. 
30. Id. at 267. 
31. I d. at 268. The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides that "Congress 
shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press ... " The 
Fourteenth Amendment, referring to "due process of law" has been interpreted to apply 
these guarantees to the States. 
32. 376 U.S. at 278-79. 
33. Id. at 279-80. This is the famous New York Times test that is the focal point for 
cases such as Gertz, Time v. Hill and others, infra. 
34. Justices Black, Douglas and Goldberg concurred, although they believed the 
words "Congress shall make no law" from the First Amendment conferred an absolute 
right of freedom of the press and of the citizenry to free debate. I d. at 293-305. 
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The battle between individual rights and the press becomes more mark-
ed when the individual is not a public official and the issue involves privacy 
instead of defamation, such as in Time, Inc. v. Hill. 35 Justice Brennan, again 
for the majority, stated that although Hill was not a public official, the 
opening of a new play, which was tied to an actual situation, was a matter of 
public interest. Once that was decided, the Court held the New York Times 
standard was appropriate even in false light privacy cases. 
. . . the constitutional protections for speech and press preclude the 
application of the New York statute to redress false reports of 
matter of public interest in the absence of proof that the defendant 
published the report with knowledge of its falsity or in reckless 
disregard of the truth. 36 
Life in a civilized society required the exposure, to some degree, of the self to 
others; and this risk was necessary in a society which placed such value on 
First Amendment rights.37 
Defining terms such as "public officials" and "public figures" for pur-
poses of applying the strict New York Times test caused the Court some 
difficulty in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. 38 Falsehoods printed about the 
plaintiff39 prompted him to sue for defamation, but he was denied recovery 
by the lower courts. Although it was decided that Gertz was neither a public 
official nor a public figure, the Court of Appeals applied the New York 
35. 385 U.S. 374 (1967). In 1952, James Hill and his family had been held captive for 
nineteen hours by three escaped convicts. The family was treated well, and was released 
unharmed. A book, The Desperate Hours byJoseph Hayes, was later written, loosely 
based on the experience, and was made into a play ih 1955. Unlike the actual experience, 
however, the convicts in the book and play were physically and verbally abusive to the 
portrayed family. Life Magazine, published by Time, Inc., contained an article about the 
play which named the Hill family and strongly suggested that it was an accurate repre-
sentation of the true occurrence. The article even went so far as to have the actors 
photographed at the former Hill home. Hill sued for invasion of privacy under the New 
York Civil Rights statute§§ 50 and 51, and was awarded $30,000 in compensatory dam-
ages. 385 U.S. at 379-80. 
36. Id. at 387-88. 
37. Id. at 388. The case was remanded in order for a jury to determine if there had 
been actual malice, the New York Times test, as extended to this case. I d. at 398. Justices 
Black and Douglas again concurred, but with the same reservations as in New York 
Times. Justice Harlan concurred in part, disagreeing as to "the proper standard of 
liability to be applied on remand." I d. at 402. The Chief Justice and Justice Clark joined 
Justice Fortas in dissent, finding no need for a remand. ld. at 417. For an excellent 
discussion of Sullivan and Hill, see Nimmer, "The Right to Speak from Times to Time: 
First Amendment Theory Applied to Libel and Misapplied to Privacy," 56 Cal. L. Rev. 
935 (1968). 
38. 418 u.s. 323 (1974). 
39. Elmer Gertz, an attorney, was hired by the family of a youth named Nelson, who 
had been killed by a policeman in Chicago in 1968. The officer, Richard Nuccio, was 
convicted of second-degree murder, and the Nelson family brought a civil suit against 
him. Robert Welch, Inc. published American Opinion, the magazine of the John Birch 
Society, which in 1969 printed an article entitled "Frame-Up: Richard Nuccio and The 
War On Police." The article falsely labeled Gertz a "Communist-fronter," a "Leninist," 
and an advocate of violent overthrow of the U.S. government. I d. at 326.1t also contained 
a picture of the attorney with the caption "Elmer Gertz of Red Guild harrasses Nuccio," 
keyed to Gertz's past membership in the National Lawyers Guild. Id. at 327. 
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Times test, and held that actual malice had not been shown.40 The test was 
applied because the discussion was of a "public issue."41 
The Supreme Court, through Powell, J., declared that a plaintiff's status 
must be determined in light of his participation in the controversy that gave 
rise to the defamation.42 Powell then explained that the State had a greater 
interest in protection of a private individual than of a public figure, due to 
increased vulnerability. Therefore the New York Times Standard should not 
be applied with private figures; instead the State should be allowed to define 
its own standards.43 The Court did not declare a new test for the State, but it 
did set the outer limits: the State may allow liability for defamatory false-
hoods about a private individual, like Gertz, with less demanding proof than 
under New York Times 44 but more than mere strict liability would have to be 
shown.45 The New York Times test must be satisfied, however, for any award 
of punitive damages.46 
C. Private Information 
If information concerning family or personal secrets is distributed to the 
public, does the aggrieved party have a privacy claim against the individual 
publisher? Yes, said the California court in the famous case of Melvin v. 
Reid.47 There the plaintiff prevailed when she showed that a motion picture 
had disclosed her former, private life: she had been a prostitute and had been 
the defendant in a murder trial. While the dissemination of such information 
may thus properly lead to a privacy action, in recent times the focus in this 
area has been on the dissemination of such arguably private information by 
government authorities. See, for example, the opinion written by Justice 
Douglas, writing for the Supreme Court, in Wisconsin v. Constantineau.48 
The police had posted notices of a ban against sale of alcohol to the plaintiff. 
40. 418 U.S. at 327-32. 
41. Id. at 329. 
42. Id. at 352. Being the family lawyer was held not enough to make Gertz a public 
figure. 
43. Id. at 344. 
44. Id. at 348. 
45. Id. at 347. 
46. I d. at 349. The case was remanded for a determination of liability and damages. 
Burger, C.J. and Justices Douglas, Brennan, and White vigorously dissented. See also, 
Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 488 (1976). Time Magazine published in its "Milestones" 
section: 
DIVORCED. By Russell A. Firestone Jr., 41, heir to the tire fortune: Mary Alice 
Sullivan Firestone, 32 his third wife; . . . on grounds of extreme cruelty and 
adultery; ... The 17-month intermittent trial produced enough testimony of 
extramarital adventures on both sides, said the judge, "to make Dr. Freud's hair 
curl." 
I d. at 452. The last line was taken from the court opinion which had granted the divorce, 
but, since the judge had never actually stated whether adultery or extreme cruelty was 
the basis for his divorce decree, the Milestones item arguably was false. Id. at 458. 
Because Mrs. Firestone, of the well known tire family, was then declared a private 
individual by the Supreme Court, she would be allowed to recover if she proved that 
Time, Inc. was at fault only under the lesser Gertz standard. Justices Brennan, White and 
Marshall dissented. For earlier cases in this area, see, Curtis Publishin~ Co. v. Butts, 388 
U.S. 130 (1967) and Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971). 
47. 112 Cal. App. 285, 297 Pac. 91 (1931). 
48. 400 U.S. 433 (1971). 
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The Supreme Court struck down the state statute that allowed the police to 
forbid the sale or gift of liquor to persons deemed to be alcoholics, 49 saying 
that this posting was ". . . such a stigma or badge of disgrace that procedur-
al due process require[d] notice and an opportunity to be heard."50 The 
plaintiff must be given the chance to defend herself against such a "badge of 
infamy."51 
In balancing the peace of the community against being labeled publicly 
an alcoholic, the Court tipped the scales toward privacy in Constantineau. 
When the opposing interest is freedom of the press, as in the defamation 
cases, however, the weight recently seems to be on the other side. Cox 
Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn52 dealt with disclosure of the name of a rape 
victim.53 A reporter for the defendant used the raped girl's name in a tele-
vised news report. Her father then brought suit alleging invasion of his 
privacy, and violation of a Georgia statute. 54 The Supreme Court declared it 
had jurisdiction,55 and found for the defendant when it framed the issue 
narrowly, as: " ... whether the State may impose sanctions on the accurate 
publication of the riame of a rape victim obtained from . . . judicial records 
which are maintained in connection with a public prosecution and which 
themselves are open to public inspection."56 The commission of a crime and 
subsequent prosecution and judicial proceedings are matters of legitimate 
public concern which the press has the responsibility to report. The fact that 
this was a matter of public record illustrated that Georgia must have be-
lieved it was of valid interest to the community.57 
49. Wisconsin Statute § 176.26 (19670, which the Court stated provided in pertinent 
part that: 
... designated persons may in writing forbid the sale or gift of intoxicating 
liquors to one who "by excessive drinking" produces described conditions or 
exhibits specified traits, such as exposing himself or family "to want" or becom-
ing "dangerous to the peace of the community." 
400 U.S. at 434. Sale or gift of liquor to such person in violation of the statute was a 
misdemeanor. Id. at 435, n. 2. 
50. Id. at 436. The reference is to the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution 
which states in part that States shall not " ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law ... " 
51. Id. at 437. The Chief Justice and Justices Black and Blackmun dissented, not for 
the reason that the law passed constitutional muster, but because the State courts should 
have first been given an opportunity to construe their own law. 
52. 420 u.s. 469 (1975). 
53. In August of 1971 Cohn's daughter, Cynthia, was raped and killed. At a hearing in 
1972, five youths pleaded guilty to the rape. A reporter for Cox Broadcasting Corp. 
learned the victim's name by attending the court proceeding and examining the indict-
ments. 
54. Ga. Code Ann. § 26-9901 (1972) made it a misdemeanor to broadcast the name or 
identity of a rape victim. 420 U.S. at 471-472. 
55. Id. at 476-487. The only dissenter, Justice Rehnquist, believed the case should 
have been dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Id. at 501-512. 
56. Id. at 491. 
57. Id. at 495-496. See also, Oklahoma Publishing Company v. District Court In and 
For Oklahoma County, 425 U.S.-, 97 S. Ct. 1045 (1977) where an 11-year old boy was 
charged by the juvenile authorities with the second-degree murder of a railroad switch-
man. His photograph and name were printed in newspapers and broadcast on television, 
in defiance of the trial judge's order not to divulge such information. The U.S. Supreme 
Court, in a short per curiam opinion, held that beca~se the youth's picture and identity 
had been publicly revealed in a criminal prosecution they could be published under the 
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Private information from other than formal judicial proceedings may 
also be disclosed to the public, according to Paul v. Davis.58 Police in Ken-
tucky circulated a flyer to merchants in the Louisville area which contained 
pictures and names of persons considered to be "active shoplifters." The 
respondent, Davis, was included in this flyer, although he had never been 
found guilty of the crime.59 Relying on Wisconsin v. Constantineau, the 
Court of Appeals found this procedure to be violative of Davis's due process 
rights, due to damage to his reputation. 60 However ". . . reputation alone 
... " said Justice Rehnquist for the Court " ... apart from some more 
tangible interests such as employment, is [not] either 'liberty' or 'property' by 
itself sufficient to invoke the procedural protection of the Due Process 
Clause."61 Respondent was not guaranteed enjoyment of his reputation by 
the State of Kentucky, and because the arrest was an official act, the State 
had the right to publicize it even without any hearing or trial.62 
D. Intrusion 
This section concentrates on intrusion into the plaintiff's solitude. Once 
again, intrusion by private individuals may well lead to a privacy action, as 
in the well known suit of consumer advocate Ralph Nader against General 
Motors where he claimed that G.M. agents had been harassing him and 
listening in on his telephone conversations. 63 Still, the major concern in the 
United States for at least the past decade has been with intrusions by the 
government or by governmental agents. Such intrusion may take many 
forms: wiretaps, searches and seizures, preparation of files and dossiers. 
Only a few representative cases will be discussed here. 
United States v. United States District Court64 required interpretation 
of Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control Act 65 and proved that a system of 
checks and balances was indeed at work with regard to privacy interests. 
Three individuals had been charged with conspiracy to destroy Government 
protection of the First Amendment, citing Cox Broadcasting. 425 U.S. at-, 97 S. Ct. at 
1047. But see, Briscoe v. Reader's Digest Assn., 93 Cal. Rptr. 866, 483 P.2d 34 (1971) 
involving the publication of an earlier conviction. 
58. 424 u.s. 693 (1976). 
59. He had at one time been arrested, but the charge was still outstanding, leaving 
guilt or innocence undetermined. Later the charge was dismissed. Id. at 696. 
60. Such a finding had to be made for Davis to be successful, as he was seeking 
damages for the violation of a "right secured to him by the Constitution of the United 
States," under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 424 U.S. at 696. 
61. Id. at 701. The Court distinguished Constantineau, by relying on the privilege 
which had been taken away there. ld. at 708-709. 
62. Id. at 710-711. Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Marshall and White, dissented, 
urging vigorously that a person's interest in his good name should fall within the Four-
teenth Amendment concept of "liberty," and should be entitled to due process protection. 
See also, Wahlen v. Roe, 425 U.S.-, 97 S. Ct. 896 (1977) which allowed New York State 
to keep a computer file of persons using certain drugs, obtained by perscription, that 
have legitimate and illegitimate markets. Other cases involving Government files, dos-
siers, etc., are contained in Part D. 
63. Nader v. General Motors Corp., 25 N.Y. 2d 560,255 N.E.2d 765 (1970). The wiretap 
was apparently a product of fear of Nader's soon-to-be published book Unsafe at Any 
Speed. 
64. 407 u.s. 297 (1972). 
65. 18 U.S.C. § 2500. See. footnotes 95-98 and accompanying text, infra. 
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property. In order to obtain evidence of the crime, the Attorney General, 
without court approval, tapped the phone of one of the defendants. The 
District Court of Appeals held this violated his Fourth Amendment rights, 66 
and require disclosure of the overheard conversation. 67 
The Government claimed that this action was a reasonable exercise of 
the President's power (through the Attorney General). Even without prior 
court approval, it was proper, in order to protect against danger to the 
existing structure of the Government.68 Justice Powell observed for the 
entire Court69 that nothing in the Act confers any power on the President, it 
". . . merely provides that the Act shall not be interpreted to limit or disturb 
such power as the President may have under the Constitution."70 The Court 
then noted that electronic surveillance is extremely important for protection 
of the Government and the people, and therefore did not completely bar its 
use. 71 The ultimate holding, however, was that the Fourth Amendment re-
quired prior judicial approval in order to protect a citizen's privacy. Both the 
impartial magistrate and the police officer must be involved; discretion 
cannot rest in the Executive Branch alone. 72 
When the government collects and stores information on its citizens, 
often more than just the Fourth Amendment and privacy interests are at 
stake. A "chilling effect" on the exercise of First Amendment73 rights was 
alleged mAnderson v. Sills.74 Sills, the New Jersey Attorney General, had 
created two forms for local law enforcement officers to fill in when there 
were civil disorders, such as riots. The first related to information about the 
incident and the second concerned the individuals involved. 75 The plaintiffs 
alleged that the existence of these forms would deter people from lawfully 
speaking and assembling. The Court found such fears to be hypothetical and 
speculative, and acknowledged instead that the police have the responsibili-
ty to prevent crimes (and riots), as well as apprehend past offenders.76 
Because the plaintiffs were not subject to criminal sanctions, the police 
would be allowed any information relevant to this function, and the Court 
believed that it was a matter best handled by their expertise, not judicial 
intervention. 77 
66. The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution states: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no War-
rants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, 
and particularly describing the place to 
67. 407 U.S. at 301. 
68. Citing § 2511(3) of Title III. 
69. Justices Douglas and White concurred separately, but both agreed with the Court 
on this issue. 
70. 407 U.S. at 303. 
71. Id. at 310-312. 
72. Id. at 316-317. 
73. Quoted in part in footnote 31, supra. At issue in the instant case also was the 
guarantee that "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging . . . the right of the people 
peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." 
74. 56 N.J. 210, 265 A.2d 678 (1970). 
75. Information such as what organization was involved, names of members, par-
ental background, financial information, spouses, etc. 265 A.2d at 681-683. 
76. 12. at 684. 
77. Id. at 687, 689. On remand, for additional facts,the Superior Court, Chancery 
Division, dismissed the case for failure to state a claim on which relief could be granted. 
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When the Government's files may have an economic effect on an indi-
vidual, such as in future employment possibilities, one court took a different 
position. In Menard v. Mitchell, 78 the plaintiff sued the U.S. Attorney Gener-
al, John Mitchell, and the Chief of the F.B.I., J. Edgar Hoover, to force the 
F.B.I. to remove from its files a notation about plaintiff's detention by the 
California police. Menard had been arrested for burglary, held for two days, 
and released when the police determined there was insufficient evidence to 
make a criminal complaint. The entry in the file of plaintiff's "detention" 
was ambiguous, and the court feared serious repercussions from this system 
of classification which lumped the innocent with the guilty. 79 Where, as here, 
a person had been exonerated, the court found it ". . . difficult to see why he 
should be subject to continuing punishment by adverse use of his 'criminal' 
record. "80 • f 
II. PRIVACY & CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
Intrusion by the government becomes a most important issue when 
information so obtained is to be used as evidence in a criminal prosecution. 
As indicated above, the Fourth Amendment requires a warrant, which must 
be based on very particular information, before a person's home may nor-
mally be searched. In Spinelli v. United States,81 the F.B.I. applied for, and 
was granted, a warrant to search what they believed was a bookmaking 
(gambling) establishment. Evidence was obtained during the search which 
was used to convict the defendant. Their application for the search warrant 
was based on 1) The F.B.I. observation of Spinelli, whom the F.B.I. knew to 
be a gambler, frequenting a certain apartment in St. Louis, 2) Registration, 
under the name of a woman who did not live in the apartment, of two phones 
which 3) Had been identified by a "reliable informant" as involved in wager-
ing.82 After the warrant was issued, the apartment was searched, the evi-
dence was seized, and Spinelli was arrested. Harlan, J., for the Supreme 
Court, held that the informant's tip was the key to finding probable cause, 
and, unless supported by other corroborating evidence, did not alone pass 
constitutional muster. The F.B.I. affidavit was found to be defective because 
it did not state how the informant knew this information, nor why he was 
considered "reliable" by the F.B.I.83 Because there was nothing necessarily 
suspicious about having two phones and being in St. Louis, the Court de-
cided that the F.B.I. belief that Spinelli was a gambler did not give enough 
additional weight to these insufficient facts, and excluded the evidence and 
reversed the conviction. 84 
143 N.J. Super. 432, 363 A.2d 381 (1976). The Chancellor relied on Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 
1 (1972), where it was held that the mere existence of governmental investigative and 
data-gathering activity was not enough to create a "chilling effect" on First Amendment 
rights. Id. at 11. Justices Brennan, Douglas, Marshall and Stewart dissented. 
78. 430 F.2d 486 (D.C. Cir. 1970). 
79. Id. at 492. 
80. Id. at 494 [footnote omitted]. The case was remanded for further findings. The 
court ultimately ordered the information removed completely, Menard v. Sax be, 498 F.2d 
1017 (1974). 
81. 393 u.s. 410 (1969). 
82. Id. at 414. 
83. I d. at 416. This is the two-part test of Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964). 
84. I d. at 418-419. Justice Black vigorously dissented, complaining of overly technical 
applications of the warrant requirement that chip away at police effectiveness. I d. at 433. 
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In some instances, deciding if there has ever been an intrusion can itself 
be a difficult question, as illustrated by Katz v. United States.85 Katz was 
convicted of transmitting wagering information by phone from California to 
other states. Accepted into evidence at trial were record:ings of the defend-
ant's end of conversations, obtained by electronic devices attached to the 
outside of the public phone booth from which he made his calls. The Court of 
Appeals affirmed the conviction, stating that since there had been no actual 
physical intrusion into the booth there could not have been a "search" within 
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.86 Justice Stewart, for the majority, 
disagreed: 
The Government's activities in electronically listening to and re-
cording the petitioner's words violated the privacy upon which he 
justifiably relied while using the telephone booth and thus con-
stituted a "search and seizure" within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment. The fact that the electronic device . . . did not happen 
to penetrate the wall of the booth can have no constitutional signifi-
cance.87 
Once classified as a "search," prior judicial approval was required; without 
it, the intrusion became per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment, 
and the conviction was reversed. 88 
It is possible that nothing is as clearly within a zone of privacy as our 
physical selves, our bodies; yet there are occasions when the Government 
may justifiably intrude even there without a warrant. Terry v. Ohio 89 teaches 
that a police officer has the right to "stop and frisk." This right exists 
without a warrant and with less than probable cause to believe that a crime 
is being committed, in order to protect the officer's safety. Chief Justice 
Warren, writing for the majority, decided that a "stop and frisk" procedure90 
amounted to a "search and seizure" under the Fourth Amendment; it was not 
a "petty indignity" to be taken lightly.91 However, the Fourth Amendment 
only prohibited "unreasonable" searches and seizures. Reasonableness must 
be evaluated in light of whether the officer was warranted in believing he 
was in danger, based on his inferences of the facts from a perspective of his 
experience.92 Applying this test to the circumstances of the instant case, the 
Two other Justices dissented. But see, United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573 (1971) which 
then chipped away at Spinelli, much to Justice Black's delight. Id. at 585. 
85. 389 u.s. 347 (1967). 
86. Id. at 349. 
87.' Id. at 353. Justice Harlan's concurrence summarized what he believed to be the 
majority holding, including that the defendant's expectation of privacy was one society 
was prepared to recognize as "reasonable." Id. at 361. 
88. Id. at 357. Justices Douglas, Brennan and White also concurred. Justice Black 
dissented. See also, Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967) which held the New York 
permissive eavesdrop statute unconstitutional. 
89. 392 u.s. 1 (1968). 
90. A policeman on patrol in downtown Cleveland, Ohio, had noticed defendant 
Terry and others acting in a suspicious manner. They would look in a shop window, walk 
away and return to the window in a pattern that caused the policeman to fear a potential 
burglary. He approached them and identified himself, but when he asked for their 
names, he was answered with mumbling. He then patted the outside of Terry's coat, and, 
only after detecting what felt like a weapon, reached under the outergarments to indeed 
find a gun. 
91. Id. at 16-17. 
92. Id. at 27. 
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Court concluded that this search and seizure was reasonable within the 
confines of the Fourth Amendment so that "any weapons seized may be 
properly introduced in evidence against the person from whom they were 
taken."93 
III. FEDERAL PRIVACY STATUTES 
Many recent Federal statutes deal with privacy.94 Recent cases rely 
heavily on these statutes, thus it may be useful to summarize them here. 
Title III, Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 196895 applies 
to the controversial area of wiretapping and eavesdropping. The main thrust 
of this statute is that it is unlawful for any person to intercept and disclose 
wire or oral communications unless law enforcement officials and/or federal 
agents,96 operate with prior judicial approval97 when investigating certain 
specified offenses.98 
The Bank Secrecy Act99 also involves the g9vernment using private 
information as an aid to crime prevention and detection. The Congress was 
concerned with citizens who use foreign bank accounts and other devices to 
avoid American taxes. 100 The Act requires that b~nks maintain extensive 
records on customers' identities, microfilm checks, and develop other safe-
guards.101 
Many of the Federal privacy statutes are not concerned with the giving 
of information to the government but rather the release of information the 
government already has. See, for instance, the Federal Privacy Act102 which 
deals with federal agencies which maintain records on individuals. It bars 
disclosure of such records to persons outside the agency except in particular 
situations.103 The primary purpose of the Act is to allow an individual access 
to his or her own records, to make corrections, and to request a review by the 
head of the agency in the event of disagreement with items in the record.104 
The agencies are also directed to record only relevant information, and to 
93. I d. at 30, 31. Justice Douglas dissented, stating that searches and seizures should 
never be valid under the Fourth Amendment unless made with probable cause to believe 
a crime had been or would be committed. Id. at 35-36. It should also be noted that the 
most extreme sort of "seizure," the arrest, need not be made pursuant to a warrant, so 
long as there is probable cause to believe that the defendant committed the criminal act, 
and the arrest is made on the street. United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (19760. 
94. This is not to say that there are only Federal laws in this area. Many states also 
have legislatively entered into the area-e.g. Illinois Revised Statutes Chapter 38 Article 
108-A dealing with wiretapping. Nevertheless, the Federal rules clearly dominate, so the 
discussion here is limited to such statutes. 
95. 18 U.S.C. § 2510 et seq. (1968). 
96. 18 u.s.c. § 2511. 
97. 18 u.s.c. § 2516. 
98. § 2516, § 2518. 
99. 12 u.s.c. §§ 1829b, 1951-1959, 31 u.s.c. §§ 1051-1143 (1970). 
100. 12 U.S.C. § 1829b(a). 
101. The Act was held constitutional in California Bankers Association v. Shultz, 416 
u.s. 21 (1974). 
102. 5 U.S.C. § 552a (Pocket Part 1976). § 552 of the same code is the Federal Freedom 
of Information Act (1967, amended 1974). 
103. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b), such as to Congress or the Comptroller General, or as required 
by§ 552. 
104. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(d). 
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collect such data in the most reliable way practicable.105 An Act similar in 
scope to the Privacy Act is the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 
1974,106 which focuses on student educational records. It forbids the general 
release of information contained in such records, without consent. 107 These 
records, however, must be made available to the student (or parents) for 
inspection and correction, although this may be waived. 108 
IV. THE (FEDERAL) CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF PRIVACY IN THE CONTEXT OF 
FAMILY AND INDIVIDUAL SEXUAL PRIVACY 
The Tenth Amendment to the United States Constitution holds that "the 
powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor pro-
hibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the 
people". This had long been thought to put family law under the exclusive 
jurisdiction of the States. The traditional view was expressed by the late 
Justice Black in 1971: "The power of the States over marriage and divorce is 
complete except as limited by specific constitutional provisions"109 and "the 
power to make rules to establish, protect and strengthen family life * * * is 
committed by the Constitution of the United States and the people of 
Louisiana to the legislature of that State. Absent a specific constitutional 
guarantee, it is for that legislature, not the life-tenured judges of this Court, 
to select from among possible laws" .110 
Subject-matter "jurisdiction", however, is involved only indirectly in 
the important State-Federal conflict in the family law area. More precisely, 
the State-Federal conflict has centered on the issue of State regulation vs. 
individual rights, with the United States Constitution generally taking the 
side of the individual. To understand that better, it is essential to be aware 
that the United States Constitution contains no provision protecting or, 
indeed, dealing with the family as a social institution. Instead, the constitu-
tional "actors" are individuals. 
It therefore seemed a revolutionary step when, in 1965, the U.S. Supreme 
Court, (through Justice Douglas) invoked the "emanations" and "penum-
bras" of the 1st, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 9th, and 14th Amendments to construct a right 
of marital privacy to protect a married couple's right to birth control advice 
and devices against Connecticut's statutes which made the use of such de-
vices a criminal offense. In Justice Douglas' opinion, the right recognized in 
Griswold111 seemed clearly based in the Marital relationship. He said: "We 
deal with a right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights-:-older than our 
political parties, older than our school system. Marriage is a coming together 
for better or for worse, hopefully enduring, and intimate to the degree of 
105. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e). 
106. 20 u.s.c. § 1232g (1974). 
107. 20 u.s.c. § 1232g(b). 
108. 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(a). The penalty for non-compliance with these provisions is 
withholding of federal funds to the institution, whereas in the Federal Privacy Act the 
remedy is a civil suit for damages, 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g), or even criminal sanctions,§ 552a(i). 
See also, the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1681t (1970), which allows 
individuals to inspect records used to determine their credit ratings. 
109. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 91 S. Ct. 780, 28 L.Ed.2d 113 (1971). 
110. Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532, 91 S.Ct. 1017, 28 L.Ed.2d 288 (1971). 
111. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 85 S.Ct. 1678, 14 L.Ed.2d 510 (1965). 
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being sacred. It is an association that promotes a way of life, not causes; a 
harmony in living not political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not commercial or 
social projects. Yet it is an association for as noble a purpose as any involved 
in our prior decisions." While the Court had referred to the importance and 
implied constitutional dimensions of marriage and the family in earlier 
opinions, at least by dictum, it had never before "discovered" so broad and 
basic a right to "family privacy" .112 
In 1972, however, the Supreme Court seemed to retreat from this newly 
found family orientation. It returned to its more accustomed role as champi-
on of the individual, in a case involving unmarried persons and their right of 
access to birth control: "It is true that in Griswold the right of privacy in 
question inhered in the marital relationship. Yet the marital couple is not an 
independent entity with a mind and heart of its own, but an association of 
two individuals each with a separate intellectual and emotional make-up. If 
the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, married 
or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters 
so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget 
a child" .113 
Since then, various cases involving the right to abortion were decided. 
The mother's "right to privacy", drawing on Griswold and related decisions, 
was the most important basis for these holdings.l14 The conclusion essential-
ly was that, during the first three months, no countervailing interests exist to 
inhibit the mother's right to privacy and her physician's right to decide on 
abortion. After that the State's interest in the mother's health is sufficiently 
strong to permit reasonable regulation of the abortion procedure, but that 
the State may effectuate any interest in the life of the fetus only after 
viability has been reached after roughly six months of pregnancy. 
Especially in the light of the 1976 decision all but excluding husbands 
and parents of minors from the abortion decision, 115 the abortion cases 
appear to strengthen the conclusion that the Court considers that it is deal-
ing with individual sexual privacy, rather than with any right inherent in 
marriage. Other cases which could (but need not be) read as de-emphasizing 
the relevance of marriage in constitutional terms are more than a dozen 
illegitimacy cases that have been decided by the U.S. Supreme Court since 
1968 and have essentially equalized the legal status of legitimate and illegiti-
mate children. 116 
112. E.g., Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 8 S.Ct. 723, 31 L.Ed. 654 (1888); Pierce v. Soc. of 
Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 45 S.Ct. 571, 69 L.Ed. 1070 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390,43 
S.Ct. 625, 67 L.Ed. 1042 (1923). But compare "Equal Protection" cases, e.g., Loving v. 
Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 87 S.Ct. 1817, 18 L.Ed.2d 1010 (1967); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 
535, 62 S.Ct. 1110, 86 L.Ed. 1655 (1942). 
113. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 92 S.Ct. 1029, 31 L.Ed.2d 349 (1972). 
114. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 93 S.Ct. 705, 35 L.Ed.2d 147 (1973); Doe v. Bolton, 410 
U.S. 179, 93 S.Ct. 739, 35 L.Ed.2d 201 (1973); Bigelow V. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 95 S.Ct. 
2222, 44 L.Ed.2d 600 (1975); Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 96 S.Ct. 2868, 49 L.Ed.2d 826 
(1976). 
115. Planned Parenthood of Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52,96 S.Ct. 2831,49 L.E2.22 
788 (1976); Belotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132, 96 S.Ct. 2857, 49 L.Ed.2d 844 (1976). 
116. E.g., Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 88 S.Ct. 1509, 20 L.Ed.2d 436 (1968); Weber v. 
Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 92 S.Ct. 1400, 31 L.Ed.2d 768 (1972). Generally, see H. 
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Yet other cases appear to signal reservations about Eisenstadt: There is 
Justice Douglas' decision in which the Court upheld a zoning ordinance that 
forbade a "commune" from establishing itself in a residential area. 117 (Since 
the zoning ordinance did not forbid two unmarried persons from living 
together, that case might be reconciled with Eisenstadt.) More importantly, 
in 1976, the Court affirmed a Virginia sodomy conviction involving consent-
ing male adults. 118 The lower court's majority opinion had stressed that the 
Griswold right to privacy was based on marriage, whereas the homosexuals 
in question were, of course, not married and, accordingly, not entitled to 
protection. The dissenting opinion protested that the marital/non-marital 
distinction emphasized by the majority had fallen under Eisenstadt. Unfor-
tunately, the Supreme Court did not address itself to this issue. It simply 
affirmed the lower court's decision without providing any clarifying opinion. 
Needless to say, confusion concerning the scope of the right to privacy as 
applied to these questions now reigns in the lower courts and state supreme 
courts. For instance, Eisenstadt has been applied in a federal district court 
case which struck down a zoning ordinance that prohibited two unmarried 
persons from living together. 119 Even (or especially) after Commonwealth, 
the marital/non-marital distinction would seem to prevent (and in several 
courts has prevented) prosecution of a married couple for sodomy or other 
consensual sexual activity carried on in the privacy of their home. 120 With 
regard to the latter (and with due apology for the unfortunate subject matter 
which, for lack of other cases, is the sole vehicle in which this line of analysis 
may be pursued), two exceptions have been recognized in recent decisions. 
First, there is the case of forcible sodomy which, of course, merits no protec-
tion, constitutional or otherwise, and convictions involving married couples 
have been upheld. 121 Backtracking from Griswold, however, may not neces-
sarily stop at forcible sodomy. Concerning the quite different question of 
consensual marital sodomy Bateman concluded: 
Sodomy has been considered wrong since early times in our 
civilization. Deuteronomy 23:17. Leviticus 18:22-23; 4 Blackstone, 
Commentaries 215; 2 Pollock & Maitland. The History of English 
Law 556. The lewd and lascivious acts prohibited in this state have 
also been traditionally prohibited. The legislature has thus made 
certain sexual behavior criminal by its power to regulate the health, 
morals and welfare of its people. This type of activity has not been 
discussed by the United States Supreme Court. We therefore hold 
that sexual activity between two consenting adults in private is not 
a matter of concern for the State except insofar as the legislature has 
acted to properly regulate the moral welfare of its people, and has 
specifically prohibited sodomy and other specified lewd and lascivi-
i 
Krause, Illegitimacy: Law and Social Policy (1971); H. Krause, Family Law in a Nutshell 
130-139, 145-149 (1977). 
117. Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 94 S.Ct. 1536, 39 L.Ed.2d 797 (1974). 
118. Doe v. Commonwealth's Atty. for City of Richmond, 403 F.Supp. 1199 (E.D.Va. 
1975), aff'd. 425 U.S. 901, 96 S.Ct. 14989·, 47 L.Ed.2d 751 (1976). 
119. O'Grady v. Town of North Castle, (D.C.S.N.Y. 1975). 
120. Cotner v. Henry, 394 F.2d 873 (7t8 Cir. 1968). 
121. State v. Bateman, 113 Ariz. 107, 547 P.2d 6 (1976). 
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ous acts. While we are very well aware that some of the acts com-
plained of are not universally condemned, we are equally cognizant 
of our role as the judicial branch of government and not the legisla-
tive. 
In another case involving consensual sodomy in marriage, the Fourth Circuit 
Court of Appeals was persuaded that a marital right to privacy may be 
waived. It upheld a married couple's conviction for consensual sodomy 
because, "once they accept onlookers, whether they are close friends, chance 
acquaintances, observed 'peeping Toms' or paying customers, they may not 
exclude the state as a constitutionally forbidden intruder" and "remain 
protected in their expectation of privacy in their own bedroom". The dissent-
ing judges argued strenuously that the constitutional right of privacy is in no 
way conditioned on secrecy and applied whether a third party or a camera is 
present. An unusual feature of the case that may have helped persuade Chief 
Judge Haynsworth to write for the majority as he did, was that the couple 
had advertised their wish "to meet people", a man had responded, photo-
graphs of the conduct were taken and carelessly exposed to the wife's young 
(11 and 13 years old) daughters who carried them to school, with predictable 
results. 122 
A final, perhaps appropriate light, is shed on the continuing controversy 
by a recent Pennsylvania case which found that the constitutional right of 
privacy now goes as far as to prohibit actions for tort damages in cases 
involving adultery, whereas traditional law had allowed the "injured" 
spouse to sue the partner's paramour. The Court held that "if the plaintiff's 
wife has a constitutional right to secure contraceptive devices, to undergo an 
abortion, to undergo a hysterectomy . . . all without the consent of her 
spouse, it stands to reason that she likewise has the right to engage in 
voluntary, natural sexual relations with a person of her choice."123 
This discussion by no means exhausts the subject of "privacy" in family-
related contexts. Important issues have arisen and been decided in the area 
of schooling, 124 freedom of religion, 125 and parental rights regarding their 
children.126 
122. Lovisi v. Slayton, 539 F.2d 349 (4th Cir. 1976). 
123. Kyle V. Albert, 2 Fam. L. Rep'tr. 2361 (Pa. Ct. Comm. Pleas, March 16, 1976); cf. 
Fadgen v. Lenker, 365 A.2d 147 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1976). 
124. E.g., Yoder, infra note 125; Meyer, Pierce, supra note 112; cf. Tinker v. Des 
Moines Ind. Comm.1School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 89 S.Ct. 733, 21 L.Ed.2d 731 (1969); Baker v. Owen, 395 F.Supp. 294 (M.D.N.C. 1975), aff'd., 423 U.S. 907, 96 S.Ct. 210,46 L.Ed.2d 137 
(1975). 
125. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205,92 S.Ct. 1526,32 L.Ed.2d 15 (1972). See generally, 
Marcus, "The Forum of Conscience: Applying Standards Under the Free Exercise 
Clause", 1973 Duke L.J. 1217. 
126. E.g., Alsager v. Dist. Ct. of Polk Co., Iowa, (Juv. Div.)-F.2d-(8th Cir., Dec. 8, 
1976); Matter of J.S. & C., 129 N.J. Super. 466, 324 A.2d 90 (1974); cf. In re Green, 448 Pa. 
338, 292 A.2d 387 (1972); Hart v. Brown, 29 Conn. Sup. 368, 289 A.2d 386 (1972). 
